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I. PROGRESS IN THE NINETEEN-FIFTIES
A. INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure for me to read a paper before you today on the prog-
ress of the production system in the Japanese shipbuilding industry. In
speaking of this progress I am somewhat self-conscious, because I have been
closely connected with it myself. However, to give you a better under-
standing of the history of this progress, I can think of no better way than
to explain it by tracing my own technical remembrance. I shall be very
happy if you would be generous enough to allow me to proceed with an explana-
tion in this way.
In 1946, General Headquarters of the Allied Occupation Forces (herein-
after referred to as G .H .Q.) instructed the former Harima Shipbuilding Co.,
Ltd. in Aioi (hereinafter referred to as Harima) to refloat and scrap sunken
naval vessels in the vicinity of Kure, where there was a major former
Japanese Navy base, and to repair vessels under the repatriation program.
For the purpose, G.H.Q. authorized the use of the shipbuilding and repair
facilities within the former Japanese Navy base, which is the area now being
operated by IHI as their shipyard and machining factory.
I was appointed by Harima as the Chief of the Refloat and Scrapping
Section and simultaneously as the Deputy Chief of the Technical Department
at Kure. I was thirty-five years old at that time. In those days, private
shipyards were authorized only to engage in the construction of fishing boats,
coastal service ships, or repair work on ships under the repatriation program.
While I was engaged in that business, the Korean War broke out in
1950 and the policy of G.H.Q. was substantially changed. Under this policy
change, Japanese industries were stimulated and Japanese private shipbuilders
were authorized to build new ocean-going vessels, most of which were financed
and subsidized by the governmental special account established as a counter-
part of the so-called GARIOA and EROA funds (Government Appropriation for
Relief in Occupied Area fund and Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area
fund) . However, Kure was not authorized to build new vessels because Kure
had been one of the Navy yards.
In the autumn of 1949, National Bulk Carriers, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as N.B.C.) approached the Japanese Government to lease the
shipbuilding facilities of the former Kure Navy Yard for the construction
of vessels for its own use. For the promotion of the economic restoration
of the Kure district, which had been deeply depressed due to the surrender,
the government formally authorized the application of N.B.C., in August of
1951. Thus, the Kure Shipyards Division of N.B.C. was born and a part of
the Harima staff was transferred to N.B.C. I joined N.B.C. as the Japanese
Chief Engineer and was concurrently in the position of representing the
Japanese engineers working for N.B.C. This was the starting point of my
involvement in new shipbuilding after the end of the War. Also, this was
the starting point of the development of modern shipbuilding activities in
Japan.
Before the end of the war, I had been engaged in the building of
merchant vessels as a member of the basic design department until 1941, after
that as a production planning engineer for the Navy between 1942/43, then
as production superintendent at Harima Aioi Shipyard. In the autumn of 1944,
the government decided to divert the shipbuilding engineers and facilities
for the production of airplanes (small fighters) and I was also mobilized
in January of 1945 for the purpose.
While I was analyzing in detail the complete sets of basic design
drawings and engineering data for contemplated airplanes, which were supplied
by the Navy, I noticed that engineering information and data issued by the
engineering department were in full coincidence with the detail items for
the production system. In other words, I was strongly impressed by the fact
that all necessary information and data required for each stage of the
production system, such as material flow, fabrication, sub-assembly, assembly,
and final erection, were clearly described in detail sheets by breaking down
the basic design drawings, which essentially deal with the finished product
(that is, with the functional design of the airplane). Actually, this prac-
tice might have been a copy of the production system and the way of providing
necessary information and data for production in the American automobile and
aircraft industries.
The idea that such a production system might be applied to shipbuilding
was implanted in my mind, and this became a guiding principle in my study to
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prepare for the day when new shipbuilding at Kure might be authorized. With
the commencement of negotiations between the government and N.B.C., I started
with several of my assistants to develop my idea, modifying the conventional
shipbuilding system by introducing elements from the aircraft production
system. Preliminary plans were developed, and these were deemed applicable
for actual production by N.B.C. when negotiations with the government were
finally successful.
It is my belief to this day that the initial appreciation and encourage-
ment of our idea by Mr. Elmer L. Hann, the representative of the N.B.C.
project in Kure and the leader of the shipbuilding engineers in the new
N.B.C. Kure shipyard, was the starting point of the modernization of
Japanese shipbuilding technology.
B. APPLICATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM TO HULL STEEL WORK
As its first application, the new system was applied to hull steel
work, which was clearly divided into five stages, namely, mold loft, fabri-
cation, sub-assembly, assembly, and erection. Each stage formed an organi-
zation consisting of a superintendent with the necessary staff, and was
allocated the necessary area and facilities. Details of the work to be done
at each stage were clearly documented, and all necessary information and
data required for the work within each stage of production were provided.
Based on these data and the master schedule of hull steel work which shows
the sequence and timing of the erection of each hull assembly.unit, each
stage was managed under the responsibility of its own superintendent. In
other words, each stage was regarded as an independent workshop. Manning
or allocation of workers required for each type of job within each workshop
was planned and executed under the responsibility of each superintendent.
The procedures required for this system have since been refined and
computerized, and the way of production has been automated to a large extent.
Consequently, the physical appearance of new shipyards in Japan are quite
different from that of the early phase of N.B.C., but the basic criteria of
the production system still remain unchanged.
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At the outset, most of our energies were concentrated on maintaining
the accuracy of the production schedule and the accuracy of geometrical
dimensions of each piece and each unit at the earlier stages of hull steel
work. Even though the actual techniques used for these ends were very
primitive, yet we could achieve epoch-iaking reductions of the manhours
required per ton of steel work of the first hull, a 38,000 DWT tanker
which was the largest in the world at that time.
The next item we approached was quality control in welding. The quality
of Japanese steel material at that time was not adequate to respond to manual
welding rods imported from the United States and to the submerged arc welding
technique introduced so that we were troubled by many problems. These
problems were more diverse and frequent than can be imagined by engineers
today. However, the weldability of Japanese steel material was rapidly
improved by joint research of the staff members from both industrial and
laboratory sides and most of the troubles were cleared up by 1954-1955.
For this improvement, activities and joint research by the members of The
Society of Naval Architects of Japan, The Japan Welding Society, The Japan
Welding Engineering Society, The Japan Iron & Steel Federation, MOT and MITI,
are deeply appreciated. And in some respects, this joint research work was
one of the most important Japanese industrial improvements, not only for
shipbuilding but also for the steel industry in general.
All data necessary for production at each stage were worked out manually.
Apart from the low wage rate of Japanese labor at that time, the manual pro-
cess was effective enough, and was actually more able to cope with the trial
and error that was necessary before the system was improved and refined.
This principle was followed in the application of the new system to the
outfitting work, and also in the development of other new production systems.
At present, of course, the process itself is almost fully computerized.
However, the accuracy of the production schedule for each piece and each unit
during the earlier stages of hull steel work, and the accuracy of geometrical
form, are still the underlying principles that permit the reduction of build-
ing costs and the rationalization of the entire production operation, includ-
ing outfitting. In order to achieve these basic aims, it is absolutely
necessary to resolve all problems within each production stage, and also
problems at the interfaces between production stages. Those problems should
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be analysed, pragmatic and technical solution methods should be established,
and then these should be applied so as to improve the production system
partially or totally.
In order to achieve this process of production management, we appointed
several veteran university graduates as team leaders, and organized separate
working organizations for the production superintendent of each stage to
pursue and trace the problems. Thus, we achieved the original plans, and
arrived at effective, workable situations. Through this study process, new
methods of production and rearrangement of production facilities were sug-
gested. The accumulation of such improvements, together with continued inno-
vations created from time to time in accordance with changes of the industrial
environment around the Japanese shipbuilding industry, resulted in a modern
form of shipbuilding technology quite distinct from the techniques of earlier
days.
The bending of steel plates by line heating, gravity welders for
contact fillet welding, etc., are some of the results of these early studies,
and they are still widely used today.
C. APPLICATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM TO OUTFITTING WORK
The conventional outfitting system was to procure or fabricate outfitting
pieces in accordance with a system drawing prepared to show the function of
each system aboard the vessel, and to install and finish them aboard the
vessel after the structural steel work was nearly completed. The task forces
to undertake this work used to be organized under each foreman in the out-
fitting shop under the supervision of the shop manager.
At the start of the operation by N.B.C., the new system was rapidly
applied to hull steel work, but the outfitting system was left untouched for
some period. However, as the downward tendency of the learning curves of
manhours required for outfitting was far less than that for hull steel work,
we started to work out a completely new system for outfitting. The first
thing I did myself was to go into the pump rooms and engine rooms of
vessels under construction and stay there at least for one or two hours
every day, because these areas were the most complicated zones to outfit
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and the greatest effects were expected by applying a new system to these
areas.
The idea developed after several months of study was to finish the
outfitting work zone by zone. In other words, it meant to divide the whole
vessel into several zones and to prepare composite drawings for each zone
by disintegrating conventional system drawings into predetermined zones and
reassembling these disintegrated drawings zone by zone, regardless of
system functions. Accordingly, the composite drawing for one zone included
all such information as main engine, auxiliary machinery, piping, pipe
bands, electrical cable, cable hangers, ventilation trunk, gratings, etc.,
so long as they were in the same zone. Procured material was put into
separate pallets in accordance with the time when it was required in the
production sequence and the zone in which it belonged. Such pallets were
brought into the zones only at the proper time and place.
During the course of this change of the system, special emphasis was
put on the adjustment of timing between conventional design (developing
what functions each system of the vessel should have) and another type of
design (preparing composite drawings for each zone, and data for material
control, to be developed from drawings for each function in accordance
with the outfitting schedule of the zones). The gap between the conventional
and new system was so big that extraordinary energy and considerable time
were required to persuade many engineer to follow the new system. However,
as this zone-based outfitting system gradually materialized, such new ideas
came forth as to install outfitting pieces on hull erection units while
they were lying on the ground to eliminate difficulties in installing them
after the erection of the hull unit. Particular zones having auxiliary
machinery and complicated piping could be completed as one unit on the
ground, then placed on board before overhead steel structures were installed.
Thus, the effectiveness of the new system began to be appreciated among the
engineers.
Over the course of time, the new outfitting system based on this idea
was gradually expanded from engine rooms and pump rooms to cargo tanks,
deck outfit and accommodation, and the system was nearly completed by 1956-
1957. In working out this new system, my starting point for the idea was
that every outfitting piece in every part of the vessel is, when completed,
always accessible without the use of scaffolding. Accordingly, by com-
pleting otfitting work zone by zone as hull work advanced, no stage plank-
ing should be required for outfitting work, except in special cases. When
I visited New York City for the first time in 1956, the production system
used for skyscraper buildings was very impressive to me, and made me quite
confident of my new method.
This method of outfitting was deemed to have been completed when we
built two suction hopper dredgers with discharge booms, "Zulia," and "Icoa,"
from 1958 to 1961, for exploiting the Orinoco River in Venezuela.
By this time, there had been considerable change in the general concept
among the N.B.C. staff regarding how to build ships. In essence, they had
come to realize that the performance of any ship, and the cost to build it,
depended not only on how the basic design department chose to provide the
required systems for the vessel, but also on how the production engineering
department chose to advance the outfit work from the commencement of the work
order to the completion of the vessel. Thus, the traditional attitude among
shipbuilding engineers, namely, that production control should be based on
hull steel work alone, was completely thrown away. At this stage of pro-
gress, building costs at the Kure Shipyards Division of N.B.C. showed marked
differences from those of other shipyards.
It should be emphasized that to achieve this system it is absolutely
necessary to supply composite drawings for each zone and to supply material
in a form ready for installation, in pallets, at the required spot on the
ship or at any other work site, at the precise time required by the outfit-
ting master schedule. This in turn is only possible by proper material
control and work flow control in the fabrication shops, conducted and sup-
ported by proper activity of the engineering department. Here, material
control eventually includes procurement of pipes, pipe fittings, sheet metal,
electrical cables, and all other material as well as control of shop pro-
duction schedules inside and outside of the shipyard.
D. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
In the agreement made between the Japanese Government and N.B.C. for
the lease of the former Kure Navy Yard for the purpose of construction by
N.B.C. of vessels for its own use, there was a clause, from the stand-point
of technology transfer, that N.B.C. should open the door to Japanese ship-
builders visiting the yard and asking questions on technical matters.
Accordingly many engineers from other shipyards visited Kure and stayed there
for a long time to observe in detail the progress of the new production
system discussed above, and to have earnest discussion with N.B.C. engineers.
Accordingsly, the influence of the technical innovation at N.B.C. was
gradually transferred to other Japanese shipyards during the nineteen-
fifties.
Another factor which promoted this technology transfer was the mutual
enlightenment between young engineers graduated from the universities
and working for different shipyards. It had been the tradition among
Japanese shipbuilders that they could open-mindedly discuss new techniques
regardless of the keen competition between their companies.
In those days, The Society of Naval Architects of Japan organized
sub-institutions for production technology and production control systems.
The achievement was remarkable for all Japanese shipyard operations.
However, it was true that most of the people who were concerned with
shipbuilding pointed out that N.B.C. was building vessels for its own use,
and that there should be a basic difference in the relative difficulty of
rationalization for shipyards building vessels for independent shipping
companies, each under a different specification and supervisor. In any case,
there had been much progress in other shipyards, too, when compared with
the human wave tactics prevailing at the end of the war. By the early
nineteen-sixties, all the Japanese shipyards had become fairly competitive
with European shipyards in the efficiency of production and, accordingly,
in the cost of production. In those days, Japanese shipbuilders, overcoming
various difficult economic situations, became able to stand on their own
feet by building considerable numbers of export vessels on a commercial
basis, being supported by the finance system of the Export and Import Bank
of Japan.
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In 1962, N.B.C. ceased its activity in Kure and all of the staff members
and facilities were transferred to Kure Shipbuilding and Engineering Co.,
Ltd., which in 1968 was merged with IHI. I worked for N.B.C. as the Deputy
Chief until August of 1960 and joined IHI as General Manager of the Ship-
building Division, following the merger of Harima with Ishikawajima Heavy
Industry.
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II. PROGRESS IN THE NINETEEN-SIXTIES
A. BACKGROUND
In November of 1960, the merger of Harima with Ishikawajima Heavy
Industry was formally signed, and at that time I was appointed as the
General Manager of the Shipbuilding Division of IHI. Since then I have been
related with shipbuilding as one of the members of IHI. After the merger of
Harima and Ishikawajima, major merging between big shipbuilding and heavy
industry companies proceeded: three Mitsubishis merged into one, Mitsui
with Fujinagata, Sumitomo with Uraga, Hitachi with Maizuru, IHI with Kure
and Nagoya.
When I joined IHI, the new company owned two shipyards, one in Aioi and
one in Tokyo. Aioi had already undergone its first modernization of facili-
ties during the boom in shipping and shipbuilding circles at the time of
the first Suez Crisis, and had a capacity for building vessels up to 100,000
tons deadweight. The Tokyo yard on the other hand had only undergone partial
reconstruction of its facilities after the war, and had only a capacity for
building vessels up to 40,000 tons deadweight. However, the Tokyo yard
had been continuously building small numbers of defence vessels, such as
frigates and escort vessels, and was equipped and trained to suit the
building of such vessels. Accordingly, Aioi was superior in the productivity
of hull steel work and Tokyo was superior in outfitting work. It was true
that there was a large gap when compared with the productivity at N.B.C.,
but it was also true that the productivity was competitive with that of
other Japanese shipyards. Starting from this stage, it was one of my prin-
cipal responsibilities to upgrade the productivity to the level of N.B.C.
and to make further improvements by taking advantage of the flexibility as
a commercial shipbuilder.
In those days, Japanese shipyards had already become internationally
competitive and about one-half of the new building tonnage was for export.
However, the technical level of related industries was still backward and
there were many technical problems in outfitting components, auxiliary
machinery, etc. In this regard, N.B.C. had already been importing stan-
dardized machinery and outfitting equipment from leading manufacturers in
the United States and these had been almost free from such troubles.
-10-
Japanese steel mills at this time had already undergone their first
modernization and were in the second modernization stage; hence, there
were no problems at all as to the quality and supply of steel material.
As to the industrial environment in Japan as a whole, all heavy industries
were exerting major efforts for expanded production. Competition between
shipyards was intense, too, due to a hungry feeling peculiar to the
Japanese. In order to earn dollars required for the expansion of the
economy, most export orders were made on a very small margin of profit.
In the nineteen-sixties, the Japanese shipbuilding industry, supported
by the progress of the related industries, achieved significant technical
progress regarding the types of vessels to build and how to build them.
Thus, we were able to continue quantitative expansion and qualitative
progress during the first half of the nineteen-seventies. This history will
be detailed subsequently.
For reference, the monetary exchange rate during these years was fixed
under the Bretton-Woods Agreement, and financing systems by the Japan Devel-
opment Bank for domestic owners and by the Export and Import Bank of Japan
for foreign owners, according to the basic agreement between O.E.C.D.
countries, were already in existence.
B. FROM MOLD LOFT TO ASSEMBLY OF HULL STEEL WORK
It can be said that the Japanese shipyards achieved the greatest inno-
vations in every respect during the nineteen-sixties.
The progress of welding techniques as the basic element of production,
together with the improvement of weldability of the steel material, caused
remarkable innovations in the field of welding techniques in shipbuilding.
The appearance of manual electrodes of iron-oxide type flux with a high melt-
ing point, in lieu of conventional cellulose type flux, made the wide appli-
cation of gravity welders possible. Developments such as submerged arc weld-
ing machines, one-side welding machines, the introduction of various semi-
automatic high-speed welding processes of the gas-shielded type, slag type
butt welding for heavy plates, etc., took place one after another, and
further progress became possible due to the improved geometrical accuracy of
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fabricated members by improved fabrication technique. In order to take full
advantage of such progress in welding techniques, together with other means
to improve accuracy of the geometrical forms, such as computerization of the
mold loft, numerically controlled gas cutting, various forms of automation,
etc., and to suit the change of painting systems, arrangements and com-
ponents of facilities in mold loft, fabrication, sub-assembly, and assembly
shops were substantially changed. Also in those days, techniques of tem-
plating for curved parts and techniques of bending plates, etc., were
basically changed to suit the computerized loft work.
In addition to these changes, computerization and automation were
further developed and taken into the production system, and conveyor systems
and magnetic lifting took the place of conventional overhead cranes for the
shifting of material. It is to be specially mentioned that the marshalling
techniques used for heavy plate at steel mills were very instructive in this
process.
It is to be noted that such techniques as were adopted in the latter
half of the nineteen-sixties and in the first part of the nineteen-seventies
are still being used today in each stage of production. This means that
the changes were significant and also very reasonable.
In order to meet an increasing demand for ships, all the shipbuilders
either reshuffled existing facilities or constructed new yards. This
modernization of yard facilities, together with the progress of welding
techniques and the introduction of computers, achieved rapid innovation
with multiplicative effects on over-all productivity.
Increased output of production per unit area, improved accuracy of
production, and punctuality in the production flow, substantially
improved productivity during these ten years. This may be clearly under-
stood from the fact that the labor requirement per ton of steel material
from loft work to hull unit assembly was 12 manhours in 1970 against 18
manhours in 1960, while manhours for steel work in the erection stage
changed from 19 manhours per ton in 1960 to 9 manhours per ton in 1970
in our Kure shipyard, for similar type tankers.
Our greatest concerns during these days were, as I stated before, to
advance as much of the work as possible to earlier production stages, to
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maintain the accuracy of timing of the production at the earlier stages, and
to maintain the accuracy of geometrical forms of the products, and this
approach proved to be the proper way.
C. HULL ERECTION WORK
More accurate timing of the completion of assembled hull units and
improved geometrical accuracy due to technical progress of on-the-ground
assembly stages also made it possible to reduce net amounts of work in the
erection stage. In addition, the introduction of new welding techniques
such as electro-gas welding and consumable electro-slag welding reduced
the interval between each hull block's delivery to the erection site and
its completion.
Accordingly, it became possible to use one building berth as if it were
two by pre-erecting the engine room part of the subsequent vessel, where
the construction was most complicated, on the same berth before the
launching of the first vessel, shifting the pre-erected engine room part
to the proper position after the launching of the first vessel, and con-
tinuing the construction of the remaining portion of the hull very rapidly.
This is the so-called "ship and a half" system of erection.
This system was very effective not only to shorten the overall period
on the berth but also to flatten out the fluctuation of the amount of work
load on all trades in the whole yard--especially to flatten out the imbalance
of required numbers of workers just before and after the launching.
Such high-speed production of hull work definitely proved, in spite
of its larger initial investment, that it was by far advantageous to build
vessels in flat-bottomed building docks rather than on inclined berths.
Newly constructed shipyards from this time on adopted building docks, and
also many existing shipyards having slipways converted them into building
docks, in spite of some unusual layout of the yard after the conversion.
The big difference between the construction of ships on slip-ways
and in building docks is in the scaffolding which always causes worker
hazards and problems during the erection stage. Besides, the launching of
a large ship from a slipway is always risky and expensive.
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D. SCAFFOLDING
As a result of study to reduce the amount of erection work, which was
nothing but the repetition of erecting and finishing of units, by improving
the accuracy of the hull units it has become possible to discover exactly
what types and amounts of work are really required for fixing each erection
unit into the hull. Accordingly, it became possible to know the exact types
and locations of the staging to be attached to the hull units while they
were still lying on the ground, and thus to keep scaffolding work during
the erection stage to the minimum. This idea was rapidly adopted since it
places special emphasis on safety. However, up to that time we could not
eliminate the most hazardous job, dismantling of the internal scaffolding.
As to the vertical ship sides, it was possible to limit the work on the
stage to butt and seam welding of the units only, and portable staging
to travel fore and aft on the flat bottom of the building dock was designed.
Two sets per side were enough for this purpose. In addition, it became
possible to improve the accuracy of timing of the work on the stage by con-
trolling the schedule of the shifting of these stages. Accordingly, this
represented a significant advantage from the stand-points of both production
control and safety.
As for the staging required for internal work, this problem took a
fairly long time to solve. Net manhours for erection work required on
internal stages had been reduced to such an extent that they were considerably
less than those required for staging and unstaging, so we started a study to
develop large movable work units with complicated mechanisms, first for
tankers as it was believed that this application would be easier to develop
and much more effective than in the case of bulk carriers.
Parts of the structural design, including the system of erection block
division were changed to suit the work units. In addition, big changes in
the erection sequences and techniques were required, and we asked for the
cooperation of the workers by stressing that such changes were necessary
from the viewpoint of safety. By installing on these work units heavy tools
such as hydraulic j acks , automatic and semi-automatic welding machine s, etc .,
which could hardly have been used before for internal erection work, amazing
improvements in the erection work were achieved.
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Based on this idea, staging outside of the fore and aft parts of the
vessel was also largely changed. These changes were achieved during the
early part of the nineteen-seventies. Later, work units for the hold parts
of dry-cargo vessels were also designed, and are being used now with some
modifications.
Thus, we could substantially reduce the labor requirements of erection
work from the conventional value of 19.4 manhours per ton in 1960 to 5.4
manhours in 1970.
E. OUTFITTING WORK
As for the control system for outfitting work by zone as stated in the
previous chapter, there was a big gap between N.B.C. and other Japanese
yards, including IHI, in the early part of the nineteen-sixties. This was
because the timely procurement of outfitting equipment was, until about 1960,
a little difficult in Japan due to the backwardness of the related industries.
Furthermore, other yards were somewhat reluctant to start the new control
system, finding an excuse in the difference in relative difficulty between
building vessels for their own use and building vessels to order for various
owners.
At IHI, as the first step to procure necessary outfitting components on
time and in the configurations required for zone contol, we started in the
Aioi area to consolidate a group of exclusive and technically specialized sub-
contractors. These sub-contractors were supplied with piece drawings showing
the configuration just before palletization, as developed from composite
drawings for each zone, together with the order list showing when and where
such pieces were to be delivered. Teams were organized to advise the sub-
contractors as to technical matters, to control the timing of delivery,
and to take care of material supply for them so that the aims of zone out-
fitting could be achieved without fail.
For the outfitting of the most complicated engine room areas (consisting
of several zones), pump room and accommodation (each consisting of two or
three zones), composite drawings together with material lists only were
issued; conventional drawings prepared for each function were handed only
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to engineers above the superintendent level. Accordingly, no other produc-
tion activity could take place than that defined in the composite drawings.
Due to inexperience, however, there was considerable confusion during the
early period, but the new system was adhered to and promoted stubbornly for
two years.
Improvements and amendments to the facilities in the fabrication shops
were also made, and new organizations to control the pallet system for yard-
fabricated and sub-contracted outfitting material were created.
Of course, team organizations of the workers were suitably altered from
functional control to zone control. This necessitated a drastic change in
the combination of worker skills in each team. Workers were retrained so
that they could manage to do multiple jobs or at least tack welding and gas
cutting in addition to their proper jobs. This change was possible due to
the flexible attitude of the Japanese union.
Thus, we were able to develop a control system for zone outfitting,
getting on the right track from the design department to the production
department, but, as stated before, extra manpower was required in the
drawing office to convert conventional drawings to composite drawings. At
first, this extra manpower entailed added costs, but as the system took root,
the reduction in outfitting manhours began to outweigh these costs. Finally,
a great reduction in the overall cost was achieved.
As this control system became familiar to engineers and workers, any
interference between the drawings and actual outfitting, better ideas for
outfitting, etc., were fed back to the engineering department. Such data
were accumulated as useful knowledge for the subsequent improvement of
drawings, material control systems, safety guards, manpower efficiency,
accessibility after the completion of the vessel, etc., and became a solid
basis for the outfitting system as seen today.
Unexpectedly better ideas were also produced over the course of time
by limiting, for instance, the angles of pipe bends to ninety and forty-five
degrees only, reducing the number of stage planks for each zone, etc.
As these processes developed, a new big change appeared to improve
mutual relations between hull work and outfitting work. It was the con-
ventional system to arrange piping along the inside of shell, deckheads, bulk-
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heads, etc., but the new idea applied to pumps, piping, and grating in the
cargo pump room and to L.O. purifier systems in the engine room, etc., was
to select the pump or the purifier as a core and to complete surrounding
piping and outfitting in a high quality unit on the ground, independent of
the hull structure. Thus, it was possible to reduce the overall cost to
the minimum by placing these units aboard the vessel before the erection of
the deckheads above them.
In cases when boilers and generators were to be placed on intermediate
decks in the machinery space, it was the practice to arrange piping under
the deck. This meant not only inefficiency in outfitting but also poor
accessibility in maintenance. By installing piping on deck, together with
the necessary grating for access, not only building costs but also repair
and maintenance costs could be reduced. Many such improvements were achieved
by the flow of imaginative ideas of the young engineers through the feedback
system between the design and production departments.
At this point, foremen and leadermen were released from the burden
of material location, which had consumed much of their efforts under con-
ventional outfitting from system drawings, and they could then concentrate
on quality control and increased production. This contributed to the effi-
ciency of the whole outfitting operation, in terms of both ship performance
and cost.
At this stage it was noticed that the application of the new system
to engine rooms and pump rooms where there was the most stringent limitation
of space was far easier to achieve than expected. By contrast, it took a
long time to achieve similar benefits for outfitting on deck where there
was little limitation of space. It was somewhat surprising to find that
the apparent inconvenience of restricted work spaces produced the most
marked improvements under the new system.
Of course at this stage each hull block, before erection, was considered
as a zone . Accordingly, all outfitting components which could be installed
on the block were attached to it on the ground. Thus, although building
speed in the dock became high and the time required from keel laying to
launching was drastically shortened as stated before, almost all vessels
of the standard type could be delivered within one hundred days after
launching.
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In the latter half of the nineteen-sixties, the supply and quality of
outfitting elements rapidly improved due to the general progress of the
Japanese heavy industries and the increased amount of shipbuilding and petro-
chemical plant building. This accelerated the progress of outfitting both
in quality and cost.
From the middle of the nineteen-sixties, with no excuses as in the
days of N.B.C., other shipyards also started to change to the new outfitting
system, and the productivity of all shipyards improved in the later part of
the nineteen-sixties or in the early part of the nineteen-seventies. The
following table show a comparison of total manhours required for outfitting
work and combined hull and outfitting work for standard type tankers in
1960 and in 1970:
1960 - 150
MH per ton of outfitting weight
1970 - 120
1960 - 50 MH per ton of total weight.
1970 - 30
In this table, outfitting weight includes only items which are related rather
proportionately to normal outfitting works. Excluded are painting and such
heavy equipment as deck machinery, main engine, boiler, auxiliary machinery,
generators, anchor and chains, etc. Manhours for painting work are not
included in the above figures because painting practice changed drastically
from 1960 to 1970.
Mutual relations between the expansion of related industries and this
new system for outfitting eventually brought about standardization among the
suppliers. The ratio of the inventory of material required for outfitting
against the total amount required per month was greatly reduced and thus the
yard's financial burden during 'the construction period was lightened.
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III. PROGRESS IN THE NINETEEN-SEVENTIES
A. HULL AND OUTFITTING WORK
As I stated before, the Japanese shipbuilding industry, supported by
the progress of related industries, had largely completed its framework of
internal improvements by the beginning of the nineteen-seventies. There-
after, more attention was given to detailed refinements of the underlying
system.
By this time, design and production techniques had become relatively
similar at most major shipyards with some differences in the details. At
the same time, due to rapid economic progress, the wage rates of Japanese
labor became nearly equal to those in advanced countries, and the manual
engineering process described above was forced to give way to computerized
processes, expecially for outfitting work and for hull work on the ground.
As a result, at IHI, computer-aided design systems for hull and outfitting,
called "Hull Total System" and "Seabird System," respectively, and material
control by computer were introduced. This development is still going on,
with the goal of improving the effectiveness of the computer as an aid in
design and production.
During this period, two important research programs were undertaken in
Japan. The first was the search for a system of determining the required
scantlings of internal structural details. In this respect, international
classification regulations could not effectively deal with the rapid increase
in the size of vessels. During the latter half of the nineteen-sixties and
the early part of the nineteen-seventies, various problems with hull struc-
tures arose everywhere in the world. A code substantially applicable to
these problems was completed by joint research of the Society of Naval
Architects of Japan, the Shipbuilders' Assocation of Japan, Nippon
Kaijikyokai (NK, the Classification Society of Japan), and by the leadership
of the Ship Bureau of the Ministry of Transport. The code standardized the
external conditions used for the strength calculation of the internal
structures, and improved the accuracy of the calculations.
The second major development was the remarkable progress of hydro-
dynamic research. Up until this time, there were only three laboratory tanks,
-19-
two belonging to the Ministry of Transport and one to Mitsubishi. In the
towing tank opened in 1966 by IHI, computerized model making techniques
and computerized measuring systems were developed and the productivity of
the towing tank was rapidly improved. To compete with this, other major
shipbuilding companies were inclined to have towing tanks of their own,
and Hitachi, Kawasaki, Mitsui, and Nippon Kokan now have their own towing
tanks and laboratories for hydrodynamic research.
Although it has been only a short time since the start of research at
these test tanks many useful results have been gained, largely related to
the improved propulsion efficiency of vessels built in Japan since the early
part of the nineteen-seventies. It is expected that there will be further
progress in this field, accelerated by the competitive spirit between the
companies. Expecially it is to be noted that there has been rapid pro-
gress in the study of hull stern forms, in conjunction with progress in the
design of rudders and propellers.
IHI first developed at the beginning of 1961 the design of an economi-
cal hull form for large tankers with small L/B ratio but having a large bul-
bous bow. This achieved a remarkable cost reduction for a given deadweight
by reducing hull steel weight while maintaining a given speed with the same
horsepower. Since then ship forms with bulbous bows have become common-
place in the design of large and medium size ocean going ships of all types
all over the world. In Japan in recent days this hull form is being applied
even to ocean going fishing boats, expecting to save at least 25 per cent of
fuel costs. Through the progress of research at these test tanks, the
design of hull forms, which had long been done by trial and error, became
possible by systematic processes with the aid of computers.
From the nineteen-sixties to the nineteen-seventies, the increase of
tanker sizes from VLCC to ULCC and the development of very large high-speed
container carriers were achieved in smooth technological steps, without
revealing any technical defects. Joint studies of basic technical matters
between the Government, universities, classification societies, researchers,
and shipbuilders had contributed to this success .
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B. PROPULSIVE MACHINERY AND POWER PLANTS
So far I have mentioned mainly the progress of steel work and hull
outfitting, but I should refer at least briefly to the progress of pro-
pulsion machinery and power plants.
Until the middle of the nineteen-fifties, American shipowners still
owned many mass-produced vessels built during the war. As these vessels were
nearly all equipped with steam power plants, most of the engineering
personnel had been trained in steam. In addition, as fuel prices were rela-
tively low, it was difficult to recommend the adoption of Diesel engines
for export vessels. However, as the superior fuel-consumption characteristics
of Diesel engines became undeniable, as the internationally known types such
as Sulzer, MAN and B&W began to be manufactured in Japan, and with increased
horsepower per cylinder, Diesel engines became common as propulsion machinery.
Influenced by this trend, rapid improvements were achieved and it became
increasingly advantageous to adopt Diesel engines for almost all types of
ships.
However, the requirements for high power for very large tankers and
container carriers led to a considerable demand for steam power plants as
well. Accordingly, progress in the design of boilers, turbines, and reduction
gears, and the improvement of production techniques and accuracy enabled
Japanese manufacturers to supply trouble-free power plants. Thus, IHI,
Mitsubishi, and Kawasaki of Japan, as well as General Electric in the
United States and De Laval in Europe, became the main suppliers of turbines
and reduction gears for marine use. As for marine boilers, improved Foster
Wheeler and Combustion Engineering types became the most common components.
Since 1967, IHI intended to introduce medium-speed Diesel engines as
propulsion machinery for ships and thus to remove one of the defects of marine
use of Diesel engines by designing a suitable propulsion system with the most
efficient choice of propeller speed, through reduction gears. After many
changes during the production of the "Freedom" class standard vessels,
designs for "Fortune,I" "Freedom-II" "Friendship, " and "Future 32" were
developed, all equipped with medium-speed Diesels. About three hundred of
these so-called "F-series " have been sold worldwide .
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During this period, we finally succeeded, in cooperation with the
licensor, in uprating power per cylinder from 500 HP to 1500 HP. The total
number of such Diesel engines manufactured by IHI until today amounts to
642 sets, and the total horse power reaches 4,600,000 shaft horsepower.
Needless to say, some of these engines are also being used in electric
power plants on land.
As the market share of Japanese shipbuilding reached fifty per cent
of the total world demand, the number of marine engines manufactured in
Japan has naturally increased substantially. Every effort has been made
to promote the advanced design of marine engines and related products,
with the cooperation of the licensors. This effort continues today, even
at a time of depressed shipbuilding markets.
Under the current international economic situation, fuel cost savings
for the marine industry are most necessary. Possible improvements include
lower specific fuel consumption for marine engines, more efficient propeller
designs incorporating a review of optimum ship speed for the present
economic environment, improved hull forms, introduction of more extensive
waste heat recovery systems, marine engines based upon a new application of
coal fuel, or gas turbines driving superconducting- electric generators. All
these and other schemes, are being seriously studied for application to a
new generation of marine power plants.
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IV. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING JAPANESE SHIPBUILDING
Here I should like to describe the correlation between the Japanese
shipbuilding industry and matters other than purely technical ones.
From the early part of 1950, a real restoration of Japanese shipbuilding
began. This was because G.H.Q., after many changes of its policy, finally
and clearly showed its new basic policy for Japanese shipping and ship-
building, and authorized new shipbuilding. As an incentive for domestic
shipowners, the government financed part of the building costs from the
governmental special account arranged as a counterpart of GARIOA and EROA
funds. The Export and Import Bank of Japan was founded in this year and a
system to finance export vessels was established. This, together with the
outbreak of the Korean War, expedited new shipbuilding for export. The bank,
together with the Japan Development Bank established in 1951, have largely
contributed to the prosperous development of Japanese shipbuilding. Inci-
dentally, after the Korean War, shipbuilding in Japan experienced some hard
times. For some of the export vessels built during those days a certain part
of the building cost was compensated, depending on the level of ship prices,
from the government "profit" due to the difference between the buying and
selling prices of sugar imported from Cuba. Needless to say, the financial
arrangements for export vessels by the Export and Import Bank of Japan have
always been made in accordance with the agreement of O.E.C.D.
Japanese shipbuilding is believed to be one of the industries which most
enjoyed the favor of the fixed international exchange rate from the middle
of 1950 to the cessation of the Bretton-Woods system. Due to governmental
restrictions, Japanese shipyards had to sign shipbuilding contracts in U.S.
dollars. The shift from the Bretton-Woods system to the Smithsonian system,
that is, from the fixed rate system to the free floating system, caused the
Japanese shipyards to suffer from tremendous losses due to the unanticipated
difference of exchange rates for the deferred part of the contract price,
and were put into very difficult financial situations. However, due to an
alleviating measure by the government through new tax regulations and with a
large number of orders due to the shipping boom, Japanese shipbuilders could,
until the first part of 1978, maintain full production without a breakdown
in finance and without a reduction in the activity of the yard.
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Due to the OPEC strategy of raising the selling price and limiting the
production of oil, and international anxiety for the shortage of energy
sources, with the rapid decline of the amount of sea transportation Japanese
shipbuilders were subjected, from the middle of 1978 to 1979, to a severe
depression.
Finally, in 1979, the Government designated shipbuilding as one of the
most depressed industries and took remedial measures. Even under such relief
measures, large shipbuilders who were not specialized in shipbuilding alone
had to take such actions as the layoff of workers, etc., to cope with the
depression. These workers who were laid-off due to the curtailing of busi-
ness were in the same predicament as the workers from the medium and small-
sized shipbuilders who had been specialized in shipbuilding only.
The first of the emergency steps taken by the government was to shut
down thirty-five per cent of the existing physical shipbuilding facilities.
For the shipbuilders who had been specialized in shipbuilding only and who
desired to sell the facilities thus shutdown, a Facilities Buying Corporation
was created by the government, and private shipbuilders were to buy these
facilities.
The second step was to lend Japanese owners the necessary building
costs of vessels up to a total of three million gross tons during the three
years starting from 1979, and to compensate the interest for the loan,
with the condition that they were to scrap the same amount of existing ton-
nage.
The third step was to facilitate the above scrapping by establishing
an organization funded by the government and private industries for the
purchasing of vessels to be scrapped and for financing the scrapping opera-
tion.
The fourth step was to designate certain cities and towns where ship-
yards were located as special districts to be taken care of due to the
depression, and to provide further assistance in addition to ordinary
unemployment benefits.
The fifth step was to organize a cartel to limit the production at the
remaining facilities to thirty-five per cent of the annual production in 1976
and 1977. This cartel will, as of this date, be continued until 1981.
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As a last step, under some special cases only, exceptional arrange-
ments were made for specialized shipbuilders to prevent the undesirable
breakdown of cash flow.
Parallel to the series of steps taken by the government, the management
of each shipyard conducted long negotiations with the union to close part of
the facilities, to reduce the number of workers, to reshuffle the personnel,
to reduce organizations and to reorganize the financial structure, all to
cope with the reduced production imposed under the cartel. Thus, with
the full cooperation of the government, unions, and communities, the Japanese
shipbuilders prepared themselves for the new economic situation.
At the present moment, the problem of the worldwide shortage of energy
resources is still unsettled. Accordingly, the international economy is in
a very serious condition, the political situation is in many ways unstable,
and thus, there is little promise that the shipbuilding market will again
become active in the near future. However within the share of the worldwide
demand for vessels, Japanese shipbuilders now believe that they can maintain
their international competitiveness, balance their finances, and survive
until the time when the international economy may take a turn for the better.
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V. HUMAN FACTORS
Most of the unions in the Japanese shipbuilding industry belong to
the Japan Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Workers Union.
Some of the unions of medium and small-sized shipbuilders belong to the
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan.
Originally, the Japanese unions were the house unions of the individual
enterprises, rather than unions for each craft. These unions in turn orga-
nized larger groups to cover them. The house unions of most of the ship-
builders organized the Japan Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering
Workers Union, which belongs to the Japanese Confederation of Labor,
forming the basis of the Democratic Socialist Party. It is also a group mem-
ber of the Internation Metalworkers' Federation-Japan Council. The union
is more pragmatic than ideological, and its basic policy is to give
precedence to productivity increases in all matters. As long as employment
is maintained and improved working conditions are achieved as time passes,
the house unions cooperate with management to obtain increased productivity.
Throughout Japanese industry, most of the private unions, especially the
unions of the larger companies, share the same guiding principles as the
Japan Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Workers Union.
Most of the young workers in the nineteen-sixties and almost all of the
workers today have received twelve years of education and are qualified for
the entrance examinations of the universities.
The racial uniformity and high educational level of the labor force
are characteristics of the Japanese industry. This is one reason why inno-
vations in the shipbuilding system could be achieved reasonably without
wasting time. It is also one of the decisive factors in the high productivity
of all industry in Japan.
In the middle of the nineteen-sixties, as explained before, the amount
of shipbuilding was rapidly expanding and the international competitiveness
was improving under the fixed exchange rate. On the other hand, however,
the frequency and severity of labor accidents in the yard did not show a
tendency to decrease. It could be said that the expansion and the competi-
tiveness of the industry were based on the physical energy of the workers.
Even compulsory enforcement of the various measures for safety guards pro-
vided only a temporary improvement.
At IHI, we began a significant program of safety improvement when the
new production system was instituted, and particularly after the retraining
and reorganization of workers to suit the new system. It happened to be just
at that time when questions of the quality of life and autonomy in the work-
place were arising among the workers. As a concrete solution for such prob-
lems, five to eight workers sharing the same work space and doing the same or
similar jobs were organized into so-called "small groups." This was in 1967.
These small groups were neither military nor pyramid-like organizations of
foremen, leaders, senior, and general workers. We gave the small groups
places and times for free discussion about working facilities and techniques,
especially about transportation facilities and the ways of shifting heavy
items in their own workplaces, all from the standpoint of protecting their
own bodies from accidents. Immediate steps were taken to remedy all problems
identified by such studies in small groups, regardless of the expense re-
quired. We also organized a team directly under the production manager or
yard manager to promote the activities of the small groups.
At the same time, special seminars were held for the foremen and the
leadermen, who had responsibility for the workplace and the ability to give
technical advice, to guide them in how to promote the small group activities.
They were trained to take an advisory rather than an instructive stance in
relation to the small group activities. Further, foremen and leadermen
within the same yard were also grouped according to their types of jobs for
the same purposes as the small groups among the general workers. Proposals
submitted by these groups were considered with the first priority and every
effort was exerted to improve working conditions as rapidly as possible. In
order to promote the spread of good ideas, and to initiate the proposed
improvements, general meetings for the announcement of new measures were held
at least once a month.
At the start there were various inconsistencies, but the activity took
root far earlier than had been expected. It was felt that the workers, who
had previously had no way of realizing or instituting their own proposals and
thoughts, had been given a voice in a very useful way. As stated before,
almost all workers had a twelve year education, they had their own good
sense, and their participation in the improvement of the production tech-
niques and working conditions gave them greater satisfaction in their work.
The results of this program of worker involvement exceeded our expectations.
As a result of these activities workplaces were cleaned up, all unneces-
sary items were removed from working spaces and everything was put into
order according to the needs of the workers directly involved. It turned
out that while realizing the workers' proposals a number of unexpected
benefits appeared with the result that overall benefits far exceeding the
expenses were gained.
Accordingly, there was a steady, long-term improvement of safety
records, and the overall aims of safety management were finally realized.
At the same time, there was a firm tendency towards improvement of both
productivity and quality control. It took from two years in some yards to
three years in others to obtain the full benefits. This movement was
expanded to the whole company, and by 1972-1974 the effect of this activity
was essentially complete.
Just before and after 1970, when there had been excited arguments about
the division of market share between Japan and the countries of the European
Community, the Japanese side, sponsored by the Shipbuilders' Association of
Japan, invited various staff members from European yards to see the Japanese
shipyards. Their first impression was, not to speak of the technological
progress, the neatness and tidiness of the workplaces and the reasonability
of the manning there. In these days the activity originated by IHI had
spread to nearly all Japanese shipyards. For your reference, the curves of
accident frequency as indicated by the number of workers injured due to
accidents per million working hours, and the severity as indicated by the
number of working days lost by accidents per thousand working hours are shown
in Figure 1.
Essentially, productivity is the result of the combination of three
elements: safety control, quality control, and efficiency control. The
true aim of our starting small group activities was the improvement of
productivity in terms of this wider meaning. At first, however, we emphasized
the aspect of safety in order to eliminate unnecessary troubles with the
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Figure 1. Accident frequency (worker injuries per million working hours), and accident
severity (working days lost due to accidents per thousand working hours), versus
year.
union rank and file. It is needless to say that we had explained the broader
aim to the leaders of the union and had reached a consensus. In our indus-
trial setting, safety control, quality control, and efficiency control are
really the same thing, observed from different viewpoints. As the production
circumstances and the reasonability of the movement of the workers therein
improve, all three of these factors naturally improve, maintaining a balance
between them. Accordingly, by first emphasizing safety, which is easily
acceptable to the workers, and by leading the contents of their discussions
tactfully to other aims in accordance with the progress of each group, long-
lasting improvements of productivity can be expected. At the present moment,
more emphasis is being placed on quality control.
This small group activity is being promoted voluntarily in all Japanese
industries, and it is not an exaggeration to say that this is one reason for
high productivity in Japan. Of course, the detailed way of leading this
activity may vary in accordance with the type of industry involved, but this
activity is very popular as the so-called "J.K. campaign," meaning voluntary
management campaign. This example is one of the most peculiar features of
the Japanese labor relationship.
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VI. HISTORY OF MARKETING/BASIC DESIGN/PRODUCTIVITY
A. N.B.C. ERA
The management of N.B.C. as a shipping company with the added capability
of new shipbuilding had been led by the superhuman Mr. D.K. Ludwig. The
period when I was working as the Deputy Chief of the Kure Shipyards Division
(1950-1960) was just the period when he was exerting all his efforts to
expand his fleet amid the high growth of the worldwide economy. His basic
idea then was to gain maximum economic results from the freight agreement
based on the freight rate per ton of cargo from one port to another. For
this purpose, he always aimed to build ships of maximum deadweight with
optimum speed insofar as port conditions, building facilities, and design
factors permitted. He built several vessels each of 38,000 DWT tankers,
45,000 DWT ore carriers, 60,000 DWT ore carriers, 87,000 DWT tankers,
100,000 DWT tankers, etc., successively, and these vessels were always the
largest in the world when built.
From the viewpoints of freight rates, building costs, and fuel prices
at that time, a speed of 16 knots was optimum for these raw material carriers.
This speed was adopted for all large raw material carriers until the end of
the nineteen-seventies without any reinvestigation. It was only after the
rapid raising of oil prices by OPEC that this speed was widely restudied.
At any rate, at the very starting point of the expansion of the world
economy during the nineteen-fifties, he succeeded in leasing a shipyard
having the capacity to build vessels of more than 150,000 DWT, and in building
up a fleet of large vessels at a-speed no one could imitate. His foresight and
courage should be highly appreciated in terms of his effect on the course of
the expansion of the worldwide economy. It is also to be specially mentioned
that during this period of rapid progress in shipbuilding techniques Kure
Shipyards Division of N.B.C. was able to meet the rigorous marketing demands
made by Mr. Ludwig as a shipowner.
-31-
B. AFTER 1960
When I joined IHI in 1960, 47,000 DWT to 60,000 DWT was the average
size range of tankers and ore carriers in worldwide shipping circles. Sup-
ported by the successful records of the operation of large vessels by
Mr. Ludwig, and by the rapid increase of the sea-borne movement of goods
for the steel, aluminum, and petrochemical industries, the tendency towards
increased size was most remarkable. During those days, IHI had always taken
a leading position in the upward tendency in size, and this position was
maintained until the outbreak of the second oil crisis.
Existing shipyard facilities were not adequate to meet this growth both
in vessel size and in total tonnage, and a rapid expansion of existing ship-
yards and the construction of new shipyards took place in Japan and in
Europe, several of which could even construct vessels of one million tons
deadweight. Facilities at the loading and unloading ports were also improved
during this period. However, due to the lack of development of basic theories
for the design details of large tankers and ore carriers, various troubles
with structural details were experienced.
Just before and after 1970, the extent of sea transportation of completed
goods became increasingly large due to the development of basic industries,
and existing vessels of the cargo liner type became unsuitable to meet ship-
pers' demands both in quantity and speed. The container system was intro-
duced. Due to the relatively low fuel cost, large and high speed container
ships appeared, and container ports on the main trade routes of the world
were rearranged rapidly. In Japan also many container carriers were built
in response to this trend, but no great structural or hydrodynamic problems
occurred, as Japan had already completed basic studies of these elements of
ship design.
After the latter half of the nineteen-seventies, due to the rapid change
in the pattern of the international oil trade, the economic superiority of
VLCC's and ULCC's was reduced and a new demand for tankers from 60,000 DWT to
100,000 DWT and product carriers from 25,000 DWT to 35,000 DWT arose. Due
to excess shipbuilding capacity as a result of the collapse of shipping since
the second oil shock, these demands could be met without any problem. How-
ever, there was still a problem in arranging for special internal coatings
for product carriers.
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Being occupied with the building of industrial carriers and container
carriers until 1977, the Japanese shipyards got behind in preparing them-
selves for the production of liquified gas carriers. This lag in the
business side and in technical development and research is still evident
to this day.
In the latter half of the nineteen-sixties, as a replacement for many old
"Liberty" ships still in service at that time, IHI developed the design for
"Freedom" type vessels with medium-speed Diesel engines, and began selling
them as a standard-designed ship, with option clauses, a remarkable develop-
ment in peacetime. Later, "Fortune," "Friendship," "Freedom Mark II," etc.,
the so-called "F series," were developed and are still being sold. About
three hundred vessels of these types have been sold to date. For the develop-
ment and marketing of these types, we owe much to Mr. G.T.R. Campbell of
G.T.R. Campbell International, Ltd., marine consultants, of Montreal. The
development of these types, as well as that of the SD-14, can be viewed as
one of the memorable events in the history of marketing in shipbuilding.
C. BASIC DESIGN
Contracts for the building of new vessels are negotiated between the
owner and the shipbuilder based on a preliminary design by the latter to
meet the requirements of the former. The investment in any ship is a serious
matter often affecting the destiny of the shipping company, and the require-
ments presented must take into account the shipbuilder's technical achieve-
ments accumulated during commercial negotiations with shipowners.
When a shipping company starts detailed negotiations with a specific
builder (there are usually many processes to be followed before the technical
and price negotiations start), the shipowner tries to be more competitive
by taking advantage of the builder's technical potential, resulting in a
combined engineering capability with the shipper. Accordingly, during the
negotiation stage, the builder, standing on a common basis with the ship-
owner, must cooperate, as its social duty, with the owner in order to achieve
maximum economic efficiency of the ship. Only this attitude can increase
the competitiveness of the builder in the free market. This is a self-evident
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proposition, yet we often observe situations when the owner and the builder
stand opposed to each other.
In order to attain satisfactory results in negotiating the performance
of new vessels, it does not require undue effort if a program for the design
is established as a module. Even for the modification of requirements by the
owner during the course of construction,,it is my own experience that the
influence of accepting new proposals is far less than generally thought.
Nonetheless, it is always advantageous not to disturb the building schedule,
and to come to an agreement as soon as possible.
D. RELATION OF BASIC DESIGN TO PRODUCTION SCHEDULE AND BUILDING COSTS
The basic design activity of the shipbuilding company is the core of
the vitality of the company. It is the fundamental significance of the
existence of the basic design department to pursue the questions of what
performance the vessel should have, and how and at what cost the vessel
should be built. Thus, the basic design department should be at the core
of the activity of the company. In this philosophy, and based on the experi-
ence of management in the Japanese shipbuilding industry, the marine con-
sultant system so familiar in the U.S.A. is not very understandable. The
existence of a shipbuilder with no such core for the development of basic
technical progress is entirely beyond our comprehension.
When Harima Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. was merged into IHI in 1960 and
when I was appointed as the General Manager. of the Shipbuilding Division,
the first thing I stressed was to realize my own thoughts in basic design.
At that time, basic industries in Japan were in the midst of expansion, and
I took the opportunity to place veteran staff members of the basic design
department in direct contact with persons in the oil, steel, aluminum,
petrochemical, and electric power industries. Thus, our basic design
department was able to cooperate to an extent in the design and construction
of factory wharves and loading ports abroad, contributing to the exploitation
of the demand for larger vessels. This collaboration is still being carried
on. In Japan, the managerial style of the major shipbuilders assumes the
form of general heavy industries, and shipbuilding is only a part. In this
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respect, we are in a superior position with respect to specialized ship-
builders, and there have been many cases when we played a leading part
during the engineering negotiations with the shipping companies.
On the other hand, for the purpose of raising productivity in the
yard, design data issued by the basic designer can be inadequate, or even
hazardous, unless it contains detailed information for the production
control system. Expecially in cases when the issue of data is mistimed with
respect to the production schedule, the data can be entirely without value.
We have had just such bitter experiences when the design for an American
owner was done by a consultant. It is our opinion that even when a consul-
tant is employed, the consultant's activity should be confined to basic
design which decides the performance and capability of the ship. All produc-
tion design should be done in the yard. The consultant may check the
drawings developed by the shipyard on behalf of the owner.
As I have indicated, the progress of hull construction and outfitting
in each shipyard has had its own history, and each yard has, or rather should
have, its own practice in the details of production procedures in accordance
with its own history and present engineering ability.
Accordingly, any innovation, whether big or small, which may arise
within the production process should be systematically reflected in the
design details. Conversely, any new progress in the design stage should be
incorporated in the production procedures. Thus, the progress of both basic
design and the production system should advance in a mutual relationship. I
believe that there will be no other way of progress than the systematic accu-
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